METR

METR and Redwood Research investigated agent behavior in the Hugging Face incident. We found agents developed a universal cheat for ExploitGym within 4 hours, then coordinated multi-day R&D efforts to trick the scorer into accepting cheats, including trying to tamper with logs.

We ran a randomized controlled trial to see how much AI coding tools speed up experienced open-source developers. The results surprised us: Developers thought they were 20% faster with AI tools, but they were actually 19% slower when they had access to AI than when they didn't.

When will AI systems be able to carry out long projects independently? In new research, we find a kind of “Moore’s Law for AI agents”: the length of tasks that AIs can do is doubling about every 7 months.

We have open-sourced anonymized data and core analysis code for our developer productivity RCT. The paper is also live on arXiv, with two new sections: One discussing alternative uncertainty estimation methods, and a new 'bias from developer recruitment' factor that has unclear effect on slowdown.

We have reached an agreement with Anthropic to conduct an independent investigation of agent incidents at the company and of their models’ alignment properties. We will publish one or more reports that will share our findings and describe our terms of engagement.

In the last 6 months, METR raised commitments of around $71 million. This will fund ambitious projects: studying autonomous capabilities, tracking recursive self-improvement, evaluating monitoring systems, conducting risk assessments, investigating AI incidents, and more.

We have reached an agreement with OpenAI to conduct an independent review, with Redwood Research, of the model behavior observed during the Hugging Face incident. We will publish a blog post that describes the terms of our engagement, the scope covered, and tentative conclusions.

We believe it's important to track and investigate misalignment incidents: cases where an AI agent autonomously took sophisticated, sustained actions in violation of human intent. In a new post, we lay out how independent propensity investigations of such incidents could be conducted.

Introducing “expenditure horizon”: a proposed method for measuring AI capabilities on continuously-scored problems. The method compares performance as a function of spend for humans vs agents. The point where humans become more cost-effective is the agent’s expenditure horizon.

OpenAI gave METR early access to GPT-5.6 Sol for testing including raw chain-of-thought, a railfree version of the model, and internal information about the model. With this access, METR conducted a pre-deployment evaluation of GPT-5.6 Sol, including an attempted measurement of its 50%-Time Horizon.

Could an AI company lose control of its own agents? To find out, Anthropic, Google, Meta, and OpenAI let us (1) test their best internal models with CoT access, (2) review non-public info about capabilities, alignment, and control. The result: our first Frontier Risk Report.

We surveyed 349 technical researchers, engineers, and managers (in February–April 2026) about how they use AI tools at work. On average, participants self-report that AI use made their work 1.6–2.1x more valuable, and that this multiplier will grow over time.

We reviewed a section of Anthropic’s February 2026 Risk Report focused on automated R&D risk from Opus 4.6. While we take issue with the adequacy of evidence the report provides, we agree with Anthropic about the overall level of risk & remain excited to pilot reviews like these.

We evaluated an early version of Claude Mythos Preview for risk assessment during a limited window in March 2026. We estimated a 50%-time-horizon of at least 16hrs (95% CI 8.5hrs to 55hrs) on our task suite, at the upper end of what we can measure without new tasks.